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 Executive Summary 
 
On September 14-16, 2004, the Advanced Concepts Group of Sandia National Laboratories in 
conjunction with the University of Texas at El Paso and the North American Institute hosted a 
workshop (fest) designed to explore the concept of a North American continental approach to 
countering terrorism.  The fest began with the basic premise that the successful defense of North 
America against the threat of terrorism will require close collaboration among the North American 
allies – Canada, Mexico and the U.S. - as well as a powerful set of information collection and 
analysis tools and deterrence strategies. The NorthAm Fest recast the notion of 'homeland 
defense' as a tri-national effort to protect the North American continent against an evolving threat 
that respects no borders.  This is a report of the event summarizing the ideas explored.   
 
The fest examined the uniqueness of dealing with terrorism from a tri-national North American 
viewpoint, the role and possible features of joint security systems, concepts for ideal continental 
security systems for North America, and the challenges and opportunities for such systems to 
become reality.   The following issues were identified as most important for the advancement of 
this concept. 
• The three countries share a set of core values - democracy, prosperity and security - 
which form the basis for joint interactions and allow for the development of a culture of 
cooperation without affecting the sovereignty of the members.  
• The creation of a continental defensive strategy will require a set of strategic guidelines 
and that smart secure borders play a pivotal role.  
• Joint security systems will need to operate from a set of complementary but not identical 
policies and procedures.  
• There is a value in joint task forces for response and shared information systems for the 
prevention of attacks.   
• The private sector must play a critical role in cross-border interactions.  
 
Finally, participants envisioned a “Tri-National Security Laboratory” to develop and test new 
counter-terrorism technologies and processes. 
 
The fest was an important first step in developing a tri-national approach to continental security 
and very different approaches to countering terrorism were explored.  Participants came to the 
conclusion that continental security would be easier to achieve if the focus were on broader 
security issues, such as transnational crime, with terrorism being only a part of the focus.  A 
series of fledgling relationships were begun between individuals and organizations through which 
actions can occur.  A first commitment is the publication by a set of participants representing the 
three countries of a joint paper outlining the elements of a Continental Security approach. 
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 Introduction 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued an aggressive campaign 
to “take the fight” to the terrorist in combination with extensive efforts to bolster its homeland 
defenses.  In the context of these efforts, the U.S. borders with its nearest neighbors have been 
the focus of much concern and turmoil with little effort to explore security in a broader view.  With 
this in mind, a workshop to explore the unique aspects of security systems required for the 
development of a joint Canada, Mexico and U.S. approach to the threat of terrorism in North 
America was held.  The premise of this workshop was that the successful defense of North 
America against the threat of terrorism will require close collaboration among the North American 
allies – Canada, Mexico and the U.S. - as well as a powerful set of information collection and 
analysis tools and deterrence strategies. On September 14-16, 2004, the Advanced Concepts 
Group of Sandia National Laboratories organized and hosted, in conjunction with the University of 
Texas at El Paso and the North American Institute, a fest designed to explore the concept of a 
North American continental approach to countering terrorism.  The NorthAm Fest recast the 
notion of 'homeland defense' as a tri-national effort to protect the North American continent 
against an evolving threat that respects no borders.  Countering terrorism in this context will 
involve the joint development of enabling systems, technologies and procedures leading to 
effective continental preventive, defensive and interdiction measures. The belief is that the U.S. 
cannot succeed on its own, and has much to gain from close collaboration with its neighbors in 
this area, particularly the lessons learned by Mexico in the management of its southern borders 
and by Canada in its formal management of dual language and culture issues.  This workshop 
explored this continental approach to the problem with the goal of developing some new concepts 
for joint defensive and deterrence actions that could be taken by these countries.  
The NorthAm Fest Process  
This “Fest” consisted of two days of intense 
brainstorming and cataloging of ideas on an off-the-
record, non-attribution basis.  The 30 participants 
represented a mix of organizations from the three 
countries including the military, state and national law 
enforcement, border patrol, academics, think tanks, 
research laboratories, private businesses, and 
consultants.  The workshop opened with a panel 
consisting of one participant from each of the three 
represented countries addressing the approach to 
countering terrorism from his nation’s perspective, with 
the remainder of the time spent sharing ideas through 
the small group brainstorm sessions.  The 
brainstorming sessions sequenced through the 
following five topical sessions: 
F m 
 
• What are the unique issues of terrorism from a tri-
• What would be the role of joint security systems a
components/dimensions of such systems? 
• What would be an ideal system solution for counte
American Continent? 
• What will be the challenges and opportunities for t
• Development of a roadmap – recommendations a
 
The process used was a combination of written brainstorm
by large group discussions. The written brainstorms were 
paper placed on the wall with the session subtopic identifi
given about 45 minutes to move about the room and enter
 - 6 - igure 1. Large group written brainstornational North American approach? 
nd what are the required/desired 
ring terrorism against the North 
hese systems to become operational? 
nd actions 
ing and small group sessions followed 
carried out on large pieces of poster 
ed at each station.  Participants were 
 their ideas and react to the ideas of 
 
 others.  At the end of this time, a facilitator took the poster papers capturing the ideas of the 
larger group and worked with the subgroup to:  
 
• organize by creating categories and grouping ideas;  
• refine by editing, condensing, and clarifying;  
• add new ideas, expand, and enumerate;  
• synthesize by combining diverse concepts into a coherent whole; and finally  
• create an outline report for the plenary session.   
 
Each group then selected a person to present the plenary report. 
 
Unique Issues of Terrorism from a Tri-National North 
American Approach 
We began with a panel representing views from the three nations about terrorism.   
Canadian View: 
We heard that there is widespread Canadian concern with the U.S. efforts towards 
homeland security and divergent Canadian views of security policy.  After 9/11, security 
rose in Canada’s agenda, then public opinion shifted away from it towards domestic 
issues. 
 
There is a perception in Canada that many in the U.S. regard Canada as a safe haven for 
terrorists. As a result, steps have been taken to tighten border security along the 
US/Canadian border. However, there has never been a full audit to look at how 
Homeland Security has impacted Canadian sovereignty, Canadian border operations, 
commerce, and NAFTA.  NAFTA had created incipient economic relationship between 
the three countries, but security is now overriding that with so much focus on new 
regulations and authority.   It appears that there are no longer negotiations between 
Canada and the U.S. on homeland security.  The current U.S. administration seems to 
view homeland security as its defining agenda and its approach is to set rules and expect 
compliance.  
Mexican View: 
The biggest challenge to Mexico for combating terrorism is maintaining its fledgling 
democracy as there is always a temptation to use non-democratic responses to acts of 
terrorism. The world watches the U.S. as an example of democracy and how it is 
practiced, and U.S. actions tend to set an example for the rest of the world.     In Mexico, 
which is in the midst of transition to a democracy, the emphasis on terrorism brings 
criticism from people about efficacy – e.g., high crime rate means people may be willing 
to put aside human rights for safety and order.   Terrorism might also derail trade 
economic liberalization.  The challenges are to differentiate between legal and illegal 
flows of goods and people and to create a ‘’smart” border.   
 
The war in Iraq has created diplomatic friction between U.S. and Mexico.   People in 
Mexico don’t like the idea of collaborating militarily with U.S. for historical reasons, 
although intelligence collaboration provokes less nationalistic response in Mexico.  The 
main threat to Mexico doesn’t seem to be an attack in Mexico but an attack on the U.S. 
through Mexico.   If this occurs, Mexico’s fear is that U.S. society will be furious and 
expatriate Mexicans living in the U.S. could become a target for public rage.  There also 
is a fear that such a scenario would provoke near-complete or complete closure of the 
borders with Mexico, badly damaging the Mexican economy.   
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 The traditional framework for dealing with security doesn’t work anymore; deterrence 
through threatening punishment isn’t going to work – prevention is the key. Intelligence 
and collaboration are the keys to developing a continental response to terrorism. 
U.S. View: 
All nations operate on the principle of self interest and these three nations have 
differences but are inextricably linked through immigration, culture, and now terror.  The 
9/11 Commission report says that these threats are defined by fault lines within our 
society and that the challenges are transnational.   If the enemy was once states, it’s now 
a “state of mind” – Islamic terrorism.  That’s not to say that we have an enemy that is 
Islam, but an enemy that is a perversion of Islam.  The U.S. has been accused of “my 
way or the highway.”  Al Qaeda has said that U.S. is the head of the snake but the U.S. 
believes that Mexico and Canada might be part of the snake too because Mexicans and 
Canadians have many of the same beliefs such as diversity, inclusion and tolerance.  
 
The U.S. is struggling with these realities and attempting to develop a response.   New 
relationships are being formed among the different agencies within the U.S. but terrorism 
exercises continue to expose problems with sharing information across bureaucratic lines 
in U.S. agencies.  This problem exists throughout all three countries. The common theme 
will be how to interact across bureaucratic lines and with Mexico and Canada as well. 
There is room for expanding continental cooperation. We are all the targets and we need 
to come up with ideas that support intercontinental security for all three countries.  
 
To set the stage for the development of ideas for trilateral security systems for countering 
terrorism, the following views were collected from the participants through written brainstorms 
with refinements from small group discussions.    
Preservation of culture  
Though we have many cultural differences, we recognized 
some shared values on this continent such as tolerance, 
mutual respect, and an appreciation of a diversity of views. 
There is a danger that we will forget these in our 
responses to the extreme events of terrorism.  It was also 
noted that Mexico and Canada do not have the same 
profound sense of being threatened by terrorism as seems 
prevalent in the U.S.   
 
Since this seems to be a “Global War of Ideas”, a continental approach might be an advantage in 
developing an “us” versus “them” approach to extremism that might enable the moderate voices 
within Islam to counter terrorism.  This would be another example of possible multi-lateral actions.  
Commercial Interests 
The integration of commercial interests in our three countries could be viewed as a vulnerability 
by terrorists.  In a sense we are a single economy with Canada and Mexico as the first and 
second trading partners to U.S. in terms of value traded.   
 
Keeping legitimate commerce flowing, even 
in times of crisis, is critical and requires 
consistent implementation of policies.  
Communication and the sharing of data 
among agencies and countries seem to be 
critical in countering terrorism on our 
continent. It may push terrorists to other 
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 crossings but for commerce the port of entry is critical. 
 
Engaging the commercial sector entities as “partners” in countering the risks of terrorism seems 
the best approach.  Technology could be used to help “move the border” – checking for “bad” 
items and people at other geographic points besides the border, such as warehouses and 
factories where commercial goods are stored, packed, and loaded for transport.  It is important to 
consider seaports, airports and rail yards – not just the borders between the U.S. and 
Canada/Mexico. 
Continental Defense 
The first step in pursuing a continental approach will be to establish an understanding of the 
goals, perception of threats, approaches to risk and decision making processes in each of the 
three nations.  We do share the goal of wanting to protect our ways of life, our identity and values, 
and our economic and social well being.  It was felt that the three countries could own continental 
security if the security issues were broader than terrorism.   
 
The next step will be to develop cooperative, not 
identical, approaches to information sharing and 
decision sharing — approaches that allow each 
country to reach the goals by their own methods 
while cooperating on common goals.  It was 
suggested that we review and learn from the war on 
drugs and the cold war about cooperative efforts 
between the nations that have been successful.  Key 
to this effort will be identifying the appropriate points 
for contact, allowing for the existing mismatch of 
agencies, and finding a way to structure this 
recurring dialogue among the nations.  It is also not 
clear that a trilateral effort will be more effective than 
two bilateral efforts with the U.S.  
 
We must recognize that our country borders are used to mark lines of jurisdiction, but can also be 
part of a threat chain or can be targets themselves.  We should consider the impact of 
considering the North American perimeter as a border and decide what the goals and impacts of 
a continental alert system might be, avoiding the pitfalls of the current U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) alert system.  
 
Whatever is done jointly must feature capacities and capabilities that are similar, compatible, and 
complementary – allowing national institutions to do the work, making each nation aware of the 
other’s capabilities and commitment to continental security -- and should include the institution of  
confidence building measures as these systems are designed and implemented. 
The Terrorist View  
In addition to considering what is unique about countering terrorism as a continent, the 
participants were asked to think how this shift in approach would be viewed by terrorists.  This 
section reports the results of the participants’ attempt to take the terrorist point of view. 
 
It is not clear that terrorists will find the North American continent (rather than the U.S. alone) a 
prime target for terrorist acts.  However, Canada and Mexico may be a means to attack the U.S. 
or a target in order to affect the U.S.  The target could even be the relationships between Mexico, 
Canada and the U.S. as a means to impact the economy of the West.   
 
Terrorists might be trying to damage the Western economy by inducing reactive spending in the 
West to perceived threats, or may try to destroy Western democratic values by invoking non-
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 democratic responses to perceived threats.  If this is true, then time is on their side and they just 
have to hold on long enough for us to destroy ourselves. They could take advantage of tensions 
between US and Canada or Mexico over the U.S. responses to terrorism to reinforce their 
extreme fundamentalist Islam views. 
 
What do we know about terrorist thinking?  Are our mental models correct?  
We need to consider the time scales of planning, recruitment, and the 
longevity of loyalty to a cause, whether Islamic or otherwise, to understand 
terrorist strategies and tactics.  It appears that the Islamic terrorists view 
time as being on their side.  They believe that their idea is better than ours 
so they cannot lose.  If they die, more will join their cause and the fight will 
continue.   
 
Terrorists may even be considering recruitment within North America.  Can the terrorists 
successfully recruit the disenfranchised on this continent when they are young and 
impressionable as they have in other parts of the world?  They must be looking for and finding 
protection or safe haven in many countries of the world, why not on this continent? 
 
The terrorists can see that our intelligence about them is poor and thus believe that they can 
exploit this to their advantage.  Since their goal appears to be cinematic destruction, is there too 
much cinematic response? 
 
Deterrence may not work against this enemy.  Terrorism cannot be punished – it should be 
prevented. It would appear that we must find a way to make moderate Islam become an ally in 
the fight against terrorism and not support mechanisms for extremism. We also must be careful to 
not overstate the capabilities of this enemy.  For example, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
may not be the real threat; conventional weapons (explosives, hostage-taking, assignation, 
disruption of networks (pipelines, telecom, electric) may be the much greater threat. 
 
Finally, the world needs metrics to measure progress against this threat.  
Role and Possible Features of Joint Security Systems 
Detection and Interdiction  
It was observed that the threats were easier to detect in the cold war than they are in this war on 
terrorism. What is clear is that anticipating a terrorist attack will require cooperation among the 
citizenry and agencies of multiple countries.  
 
The most important feature for a security system for 
countering terrorism is deterrence, and if that fails, then 
timely detection and interdiction is critical.   In order to 
successfully deter, we must understand the “values” of the 
adversary to make some devastating actions appear 
unviable for reaching their goals.  Deterrence can also be 
accomplished through sufficient hardening of particular 
targets. Once a threat delivery chain has been identified 
then we must be able to get information, and get it in timely 
fashion, to enable action. Since resources for response are 
limited effective cooperation and coordination can pay big 
dividends.  One way to accomplish this is the establishment 
of  common processes.   
 
Technical sensors for detection of some parts of this threat will be important.  Certain signatures 
are visible with some of these threats, but many threats – e.g., bioweapons – may have little or no 
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 detectable signature at all.  There seems to be no “silver bullet” sensors, but we should work 
toward a successful combination of multiple environmental indicators for detection.  Also 
prerelease detection of WMD tends to be short range at best.  While sensors are not the full 
answer, information from sensors should be useful in inferring an impending attack. 
 
The desired security system must apply technology to help solve problems and develop the skills 
and capacities in each country to use these technologies.  These systems must be interoperable 
to allow effective cooperation.  We also need to develop a knowledge base of potential and 
suspected terrorists which can be shared among the three countries.  We must determine how to 
jointly spend our limited collective resources to interdict an event before it happens.  We must 
also be alert to the fact that false alarms will occur; and prepare for properly managing these 
alarms so that we do not deaden our responses when a real event is in play.  
 
To enable interdiction, we must identify the threat delivery chain before the scenario has 
progressed to the final stage.  This will require analysis of both military and non- military 
intelligence, local police participation, and a high degree of trust among the cooperating parties.  
While information exchanges between the U.S. and Canada/Mexico are significant, they are not 
always effective because the information needs to be better contextualized to allow effective 
detection and interdiction rather than “knee jerk” reactions to alarms.   
 
Better coordination in day-to-day operations to defend our continental security or in emergency 
operations could occur among government agencies if we could identify who speaks to whom, by 
what channels, and by formal or informal methods. There are agreements in place but there is 
room for improvement in these areas: 
o Technical detection (e.g., range to detect WMD is limited) 
o Collaboration and trust 
o Cooperative policies 
o Managing resources 
o Redefinition of  tri-lateral defense systems 
A critical step would be to review what the three countries have implemented in these areas to 
identify the missing parts of the puzzle and to identify the sensitive areas in which we can agree 
to disagree.  
 
There are some interesting open questions.  How will we pay for this kind of continental security 
system since it will be expensive?  Should we use alert systems or do they create more fear?   
The role of civilian and military agencies is quite different in the three countries.  In the U.S., the 
responsibility for countering terrorism rests primarily with civilian agencies, while in Mexico and 
Canada, it is with the military.   
 
Finally, since the adversary in this war is geographically diffuse and agile, we must develop and 
institutionalize agile security systems to stay ahead of this adaptable adversary.  But we must 
also recognize it may not be possible to completely protect ourselves and prepare for the 
possibility that more violence will be exported to our shores regardless of our best efforts.  
 
Defensive Posture 
For a tri-national defensive posture to develop, it is critical to get buy-in from all three countries 
and agree on desired outcomes.  This requires well-defined relationships, many of which already 
exist – e.g., Canadian and Mexican air traffic controllers enabled response to bring down planes 
safely on 9/11.  The overall goal is to make it harder for a terrorist attack to succeed but we must 
accept that we cannot depend on the system to prevent all possible attacks.  The fundamental 
defensive posture is to keep all potential terrorists out of North America.  We must also recognize 
that attacks in one country can impact the other countries on the continent.  If a weapon went off 
in El Paso, Juarez would be affected as well.  If agriculture is attacked in one country, it will affect 
all three.  The same is true of infrastructure events since power and water are commonly passed 
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 across borders.  It will be very difficult to harden the envelope around all these structures.  But 
infrastructure vulnerability analysis and hardening could use common techniques in all three 
countries.  The larger question is the identification of the most likely risks; e.g., nuclear threats or 
ordinary car bombs. Hardening every high value target in our respective societies will bankrupt 
us.  In coordinated efforts for dealing with response such as medical facilities or first-responders 
we should always look for a “no regrets” strategy – that is one where there will be a benefit for our 
countries whether or not terrorist attacks occur on our continent again   
 
As always, there is a need for Education, Education, and Education!!!  We need a better 
understanding of risk in all three countries and how risk tolerance varies in each country.  There 
is a need for the public to have accurate information in particular about risks. Public awareness is 
very important in increasing national 
security.  As an example of post 9/11 
awareness, Richard Reeve, the shoe 
bomber, was thwarted by a vigilant flight 
attendant and by people who were willing 
to stop Reeve’s actions.  We must also 
educate decision makers – an example is 
the WMD-based TOPOFF exercises run in 
the United States.  Geographical 
separation of Mexican, Canadian borders 
raised again the issue of which will be more 
effective - trilateral or bilateral approaches 
to security issues.  Data sharing is critical 
among all three countries in the event of a 
bio-attack, for instance, but perhaps less 
important in other areas.  
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 Figure 2.  Sample written brainstorm sheetsn integrated response system and a tri-national sensor-alarm system would have advantages.  
ne should have Just-In-Time response packs ready.  WMD, particularly bio, does not respect 
orders; hence we need surveillance and operational compatibility.  There is an opportunity to tie 
 commonalities throughout agencies in all three countries but all must be involved in or at least 
formed of combined policies and procedures.  Sensors and information can push out the 
oundary of our borders since in many cases if the terrorists get to the gate it is too late to 
espond! The continent must have a “layered defense” system.  Communication and some 
entralized data access are necessary.  We need to get “buy-in” from all three countries 
ecognizing our competing views and interests.  We must understand our differences and 
onstraints and we must codify procedures since ad hoc approaches will create failure in joint 
perations.   There was a common theme of challenges in resource allocation and the need for 
ptimization of response in many of these discussions. 
olicies 
 will be critical to ensure that any continental strategy includes 
terests of all three states.   A tri-national strategy involves sharing 
isk and responsibility and the asymmetry of power makes 
ooperation difficult.  Since the U.S. is the preponderant partner, 
exico and Canada need to initiate negotiation with U.S. to ensure 
qual presence in strategy.  The onus is on Canada and Mexico to 
entify how this strategy should include “continent”.   
e need to push our continental counter-terrorism mission outward 
nd unburden our geographical borders.  However, we still need to have collaborative borders 
etween our nations that allow for economic and social integration while recognizing separate 
overeignty and accepted jurisdictions.   If there is no perceived erosion of sovereignty, the 
equired domestic political support for this approach will be easier to obtain. 
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Identifying things in common between Mexico and Canada may be difficult, except on issues 
related to our linked economies.  However, if there are shared values, we could develop a 
common strategy and perhaps even common field operations, which could flow down and be 
applied to homelands, borders, and perhaps world-wide.   
 
Should we have common security institutions for all three countries or common training and 
border patrols?  This would be hard to envision although tri-lateralism could provide a large pool 
of experience which could generate better systems, and even political support of policies.  
Presently, operational cooperation springs from local, on the ground, interactions.  Providing 
these local operations with a set of guidelines and a vision of the value of cooperation in 
preserving North America as a prosperous space and the value of migration to the continent 
would be a good start.  This might be started by a negotiated conference with structured dialogue 
and the formation and regular meeting of trilateral working groups.  This conference would involve 
tri-national operational experts with a focus on North American security writ large possibly 
modeling the war on drugs of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). 
Enhancing communications & maintaining commerce 
What would happen if security - the existence of a secure continent – became a competitive 
advantage for commerce on the continent?  This is the question which this group explored. 
 
While the policy challenges for the development and use of secure communications for law 
enforcement agencies in all countries will be great, it seemed that if security became a 
competitive advantage, the private sector would develop and sell systems solutions. 
 
Enhanced communications would be both the enabler and benefactor of this development.   The 
operation of joint security systems could enhance collaboration/communication and as well as 
enhance commerce for the region.  Enhanced communications would also be a requirement for 
the cooperative development of the technical detection & tracking systems envisioned.  
Communications can improve the flow of goods from manufacturer to receiver by enabling just-in-
time movement of such goods and could be used to help move the “border” away from a 
geographic line (e.g. BASC [Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition] which moves the border to 
factory).   It was noted that BASC-like systems require trust in the governments involved as well 
as recognition of the competitive advantage for the private sector in each nation to justify the 
required investments. The importance of personal relationships and appropriate language skills in 
the creation and operation of this kind of endeavor cannot be diminished.  
 
A provocative suggestion was the formation of NorthAm Inc - a place where advanced security 
products are developed and commercialized in North America as a continental industry. 
Ideal Continental Security Systems for North America 
The participants divided into four teams each chartered to develop a concept for an ideal system 
for providing continental security but optimized on a particular viewpoint.  These four teams 
represented the primary interests of Canada, Mexico and the United States plus one team 
devoted to thinking about this as a joint effort.  The following sections report the suggestions of 
each of these teams. 
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 Canada Team  
The Canada team began by stating the three key goals of such a 
security system.  These were:  1) all features of the system should 
respect and preserve our key values; 2) the system should be 
designed in a way that recognizes we live in a global society based on 
cross border flows of people (business, academic, tourists, studies, 
etc.) and goods and services, and 3) we should build on what we 
have, on our established relationships, procedures, and systems.   
 
A key feature necessary for enabling interdiction is sharing and even jointly developing 
intelligence.  This implies we should strive for complete access to all foreign services information.  
These include: 
- Terrorist databases 
o Terrorists’ networks 
o Terrorists’ movements  
o Terrorism support systems and financial resources  
o Terrorist’s evolving communication channels 
- Human intelligence information (assuring the need to protect methods and sources) 
- Advanced technology  
- Training and expertise  
The end goal is an integrated domestic/foreign collection and analysis across all three countries.  
There should be joint work on translation and determination of intentions.  There should also be 
joint training and technology sharing to aid deceit detection at borders by local law enforcement.   
 
The envisioned system would enable interdiction by having a joint task force for terrorism for 
rapid response.  When an unfolding terrorism plot is identified by the analysis team, a series of 
responses would be triggered.  First, information would be fed to authorities to attempt to locate 
and track the suspicious people, equipment, and materials involved in the plot.  The system 
would feed available evidence to authorities to allow arrest or seizure when appropriate.  The 
system would also allow for the timely sharing of acts involving citizens of North America. The 
suspected targeted areas would be notified to allow them to activate defensive measures.  In 
most cases, the role of the military would be to provide assistance to civil authorities.   
 
Key challenges for this system will be making sure that the system does not interfere with the 
North American states’ involvement as a member of the global community, and the creation of a 
continental common integrated terrorism knowledge system and common processes such as a 
shared visa application data system.  Efficient and effective communications will be required.  
These need to be based on establish relationships and enable joint networks between 
institutions.  The system must be willing to share and help partners build terrorism fighting 
capabilities.  Finally, the team identified several key enabling technologies which included sniffing 
capacity for explosives, chemicals, etc.,  port protection,  bio-metrics that work, and rapid 
knowledge generation. 
Mexico Team 
The Mexico Team began with the discussion of a major 
concern in Mexico: namely that terrorists will enter the U.S. 
through Mexico and carry out a successful attack.  The Fest’s 
Mexican participants expressed the belief that such an event 
would lead to a backlash against Mexico and its citizens, with 
expatriate Mexicans living in the U.S. treated as scapegoats.  
In this aftermath, there is a possibility that migrants (both legal 
and illegal) would not be treated fairly, that they and their 
families would suffer, and that Mexico as a whole would suffer economically. The economic 
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 impact could be exacerbated by an associated closing of the border between the U.S. and 
Mexico.  It was also pointed out that a terrorist group could gain significant value from an attack 
against U.S. tourists in Mexico.  A large loss of life of U.S. citizens in Mexico would be a 
challenge to U.S./Mexico cooperation.  An improper response by one or both countries could 
magnify the “value” of the attack beyond the original loss of life. 
 
Hence, the ideal solution should be designed to maximize the movement of legitimate people, 
goods and services while minimizing the possibility for unwanted individuals to enter our 
countries.  There needs to be recognition of the current state of flow across the border and a 
move to legalize migrants.  One proposal for this ideal system was to consider how to deal with 
the Mexican southern border; i.e., move the lines of control.  Perhaps there could be U.S./Mexico 
participation on protecting this southern border which could produce fewer required controls on 
the northern border!  This move to a more “borderless” area between the U.S. and Mexico could 
help eliminate this fear of scapegoating.    
 
How could this be done?  We could start with a national biometric ID with Canada and the U.S.  
There would be seasonal worker permits at the southern Mexican border, and a pre-clearance 
process for those who cross on a regular basis.  One major barrier would be selling this ideal 
system to the Mexican people and their government.  There was the observation that Mexican 
nationalism could hurt their Latin American compatriots by closing the southern border and so 
maintaining this flow was critical.  The maintenance of commerce was the key issue.  The wait 
time and number of people in lines outside ports of entry must be reduced.  More remote 
detection technology and the creation of an elite cadre of border security guards would be 
implemented.  All efforts would be working toward the creation of a “continental border” that 
would protect national identity and prerogatives.  Cost would be a driver as money and other 
resources for these efforts would be expected to flow from the U.S. to Mexico. 
 
There would be several U.S. – Mexico military cooperation challenges.  The U.S. seems to have 
a strategy to reduce the Mexican military to a police force.  There needs to be an explicit 
acknowledgement that the military has a traditional role in this arena in Mexico.  This could be 
done with the creation of a pan American force and a formal organization to deal with critical 
issues and fears (a kind of North American defense board).  This approach would be attractive 
for:  
o Reducing blame by risk sharing  
o Providing stability for Mexico  
o Gaining the economic benefits of a more open border  
o Enhancing intelligence of terrorist activities and plans 
o Enhancing trust (over time) 
o Allowing for a more effective use of limited resources  
o Reducing pressure on Mexico’s northern border  
 
The system would allow for several types of interdiction.  In most cases, local agents (who might 
be from the bordering nation) have the best perspective, but the actual arrests would usually be 
done at the national level.  The sharing and joint creation of intelligence through an intelligence 
fusion center would strengthen cooperation and effectiveness (North Am Intelligence System, 
NAIS).  This could be even be populated by dual citizenship personnel.   The key enabling 
technologies would be effective national IDs, good information generating systems, processes to 
synchronize tri-national legislation, and standardized forensic technologies. 
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 United States Team 
The U.S. team first laid out the requisite design criteria for this kind of a 
system.  It would need to be evolutionary, enabling cooperation 
(protecting civil liberties and obeying laws) which would not impede 
commerce.  It would provide timely access to information, filter noise and 
be credible – enabling credible decision making.  It would include political, 
social, behavioral considerations.  It would need to be affordable and 
maintainable with the requisite enabling infrastructures in place. 
 
The ideal security system would be an information system consisting of 
distributed databases, sensors and human intelligence (both overt and 
covert).  The system would use intelligent software agents tailored to 
each decision maker allowing adaptable questions to be asked of the 
data.  It would have an architecture of computers and infrastructure that could be supported in all 
nations would support the policies and procedures for access agreed upon.  The system would 
be ubiquitous with common training for all personnel. 
 
This system would augment decision making by the users, feeding alerts to low level operations.  
The users would be able to add data and ask questions through their personalized software 
intelligent agents.  Automation would be controlled by policies to control abuse.   
  
This system would allow more timely information than today’s systems with alerts focused on the 
threat delivery chain.  It would be much more adaptive and less reactive than systems of today.  
 
This system would be good for continental security because it accessible by all three countries, 
each with the ability to add data and get data.  It would both require and enable cooperation and it 
would be adaptable with non-prescriptive selective access by policies of the three nations.   
 
This system would enable interdiction by providing timely useable information to right people, 
take advantage of current infrastructures, and allow for buy-in from all players.  
 
Joint Team 
 
The goal of the joint security system would be to keep the threat away from continent while 
protecting and maintaining sovereignty and maintaining a commitment to rights and “shared 
values”. 
 
The national institutions in each country will do the job and need confidence building measures 
for collaborative work.  There must be similar, compatible, and/or complementary 
communications, training, and procedures for information collection and analysis.  The system 
needs to allow users to know what is available and what of that is applicable to them and be able 
to get it.  
 
The design of the system needs to engage the private sector, making sure its interests are served 
and must recognize relevant international systems and standards when developing new 
technology systems.  It also needs to engage civil society and understand concerns about civil 
liberties and the protection of individual freedoms. 
 
In order for this to happen it is important to know how each country is organized to deal with this 
problem.  Of particular importance is the issue of jurisdictional authority in identified areas of 
concern.  If all officials in each country knew who their counterpart in each country was, better 
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 coordination could happen at all levels of government.   The system needs to address all levels - 
from operational to policy levels - and extend to forward deployment areas when needed. 
 
Training will be a critical need here.  We have to develop the appropriate attitudes of 
collaboration/multilateralism (culture) while serving interests of sovereignty.  There need to be 
coordinated exercises in all operational areas and systematic programs of exchange.  We must 
recognize the importance of human capital development and skills training for these systems to 
be useful.   
There are a number of features that such security systems should have - a complementary visa 
regime, complimentary policies of interdiction, information exchange while protecting sources and 
methods while respecting privacy issues, trilateral military co-operation/coordination including a 
common operational picture of approaches to North American air and sea and land and a 
common identity card.   
Challenges and Opportunities 
Economic Challenges 
 
The biggest economic challenge in accomplishing the 
creation of a continental security system will be getting 
effective security without impeding the flow of commerce.  
More regulation creates higher costs too.  But for 
continental security systems there is an added challenge 
of the infrastructure differences among the three 
countries.  This may require larger investments for one or 
more countries with more sharing of cost. The cost of new 
policies and infrastructure and technology maybe more 
difficult now the under economic stress that is possible in 
U.S. and with Mexico having fewer resources than the other t
sector to invest where necessary will also be a challenge.  If w
approach, the impact on our economies given the current tren
dire.   
F n 
 
Policy Challenges 
For this concept to be effective, we have to think globally eve
national agendas.  There will be political opposition from som
nation.  There will need to be public support in each country f
local politicians be need to push this initiative.  Some current 
reexamined if this were our continent’s approach, e.g. the diff
Cuba.  The current U.S. unilateralism in Iraq will be an issue a
and Canada will be an issue.   Trust will have to develop amo
 
Bureaucratic systems in each country will have to be able to d
Legal issues related to detaining and monitoring “suspects” w
decision making will have to be addressed including how the 
event of major policy or operational conflicts.  Finally paying f
and will likely require flexible application of resources among 
classification issues will be a major barrier to intelligence sha
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e develop a protectionism 
ds toward globalization may be 
n though we have three differing 
e sectors of civil society in each 
or the required policy initiatives and 
national policies will have to be 
erent countries’ policies toward 
nd nationalism in Mexico, the U.S. 
ng various government institutions.   
eal with this tri-national concept.   
ill have to be worked out.  Joint 
final decision will be made in the 
or these joint systems will be difficult 
the three nations.  Security and 
ring. 
 
 Time is critical!   We may not have the time to allow the determination of correct processes.  We 
will need to strike a balance between protecting intelligence and sharing with those who need to 
know.  
 
Existing R&D and Available Products 
 
The following list was generated by the participants. 
 
• Blast protection capability 
o Architecture surety guidelines 
o CPTED (Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design) 
• Integrated security systems 
• Just-in-time custom security systems 
• Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
• Decontamination technologies 
• Active//passive protection technologies 
• Data analysis/connections/pattern recognition 
• Information security systems – information operations technology 
• Multilevel security 
• Intelligent browsers 
• Security defeat technologies 
• Seals/tags/trackers/RF (radio frequency) tags   
• Non-lethal weapons (people, vehicles, information) 
• Human behavior modeling 
• Infrastructure modeling 
• Augmented decision support systems 
• Physical security systems technologies 
• Biometrics  
• Implantable bio-track chips 
• Wide- and local-area surveillance 
• Persistent ubiquitous sensor networks 
 
Knowing where to get all of these may be the bigger challenge. 
 
Existing Tri- or Bi-National Efforts  
 
The following list was generated about current Tri-Bi-National 
Agreements.  We need to form a Commission to study this list and 
determine which efforts are similar or different between Canada and 
Mexico, which efforts are really currently in effect and which efforts 
represent significant activities, especially in intelligence.  Then we 
could look to some agencies “to plug the gaps.” 
 
- ASIS International (international organization for security professionals) 
- FAST (Free And Secure Trade) Program (U.S./Canada) 
- BASC (Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition) Program (U.S./Mexico) 
- PIP (Partners in Protection) Program - Canada 
- C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism)  
- CIP (Carrier Initiative program)  
- DCL (Dedicated Commuter Lane)  
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 - Law Enforcement Information Centers like: 
o Canadian Police Information Center (CPIC) 
o National Crime Information Center (NCIC)  
- Crossing Borders Conference (2002) (U.S./Canada)  
- Secure and Smart Borders Action Plan (U.S./Canada) 
- Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance - North American Standard Inspection Program – Decals 
- Bi-national Planning Group (CAN/U.S. military planning) 
- NORAD    
- International Biometric Group - U.S.VISIT Program      
- Megaport program (U.S.- Department of Energy) 
- Smart Border Declaration (CAN/U.S.) (MEX/U.S.)  
- CAN/U.S. chemical/biological/radioactive/nuclear (CBRN) Guidelines 
- Bi-national bridge and border crossings committee  
- “War On Drugs” programs  
- NAFTA’s inspection of forms for compliance of technical and health standards  
- CAN/U.S. Bilateral Consultative group on counter-terrorism  
- CAN/U.S. Bilateral Consultative group on Emergency Preparedness  
- Integrated border enforcement teams (CAN/U.S.)  
Technical Gaps 
 
The following gaps in technology for these systems were 
identified: 
Sensors: 
• Powerful sensors with long range  
o Range issues for nuclear, radiation and 
explosives detection 
o 100 m stand off for 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear/explosive (CBRNE) detection 
• Enhanced sensors 
o vision systems 
o acoustic 
o electromagnetic 
o chemical sniffers  
• Smart sensors that reduce false alarms  
• U.S.-VISIT  (land ports) chip-person-distance 
• Ability to tag/track/regulate high explosives.  
• Lack of threat signatures for weaponized biological agents, chemicals 
Surveillance Systems: 
• Satellite surveillance 
• Long-distance maritime surveillance  
• Stand alone power sources, better than batteries and longer life  
• Facial and biometric recognition technology 
Forces  
• Air vehicle 
• Robot protective guards 
• Autonomous (air, land, sea) swarms for border protection 
• Effective unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and micro-UAVs that can communicate 
with each other and with other systems 
• Long distance non-lethal attack 
• Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) 
Threat Detection and Manipulation 
• Ability to computationally manipulate socio-cultural qualitative data – development of 
a multidisciplinary community of experts that wants to and can engage with this 
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 • Intention detection technologies 
• Behavior modification beam 
General Needs 
• Secure info/communication systems 
• Trusted augmented decision aids 
• Cost/affordability/reliability of security systems 
• Improvements in training 
Barriers to technology applications include: 
• Speed of advancement of technology 
• Decision makers are not always technology aware 
• Public acceptance/trust 
• Who owns it? 
 
A provocative suggestion was the creation of a trilateral research and development facility - A Tri-
National Security Laboratory (TNSL) - in physical security to work the gaps identified above. 
  
Summary 
The basic measure of success that we apply to a fest is the level of energy and involvement by 
the participants, and this fest resulted in a very lively and fruitful discussion.  Several reoccurring 
themes throughout the exercise were identified.   
♦ First among these was the recognition that the three countries share a set of core 
values, namely democracy, prosperity and security that should always serve as the 
basis for joint interactions and will allow for the development of a culture of 
cooperation while maintaining the sovereignty of the members.   
♦ It was frequently emphasized that the creation of continental defensive strategy would 
require a set of strategic guidelines and that smart secure borders play a pivotal role.  
The need for the joint security system to operate from a set of complementary but not 
identical policies and procedures, such as complementary VISA programs and 
complimentary identification systems was identified.   
♦ The value of a joint task force for response with full knowledge of national response 
systems and of the available technology and people was recognized, along with a shared 
information system, sharing both technology and people.   
♦ The need for the private sector to be a critical player in cross-border interactions and 
must be included in the design.   
Finally, a “Tri-National Security Laboratory” was envisioned that could bring together researchers 
and practitioners to develop and test new counter-terrorism technologies and processes. 
 
One of the interesting observations from the 
fest was the very different views of the 
terrorism problem that exists between the 
three countries.  Basically, the U.S. feels 
threatened, Canada is concerned about the 
U.S. approach to terrorism (particularly the 
U.S. unilateralism), and Canada and Mexico 
are worried that they will be blamed for 
failing to stop terrorists who may travel or 
stage from within their country, with 
consequent repercussions on expatriates 
and citizens and the closure of borders.  
Each perspective represents an expression 
of fear.  The concern, however, is not 
terrorism per se, but the different impacts 
and outcomes for each participating country Figure 4.  Roadmap session 
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 if an event were to occur on U.S. soil.  Canada and Mexico are aware that they may be targets 
but are more worried about these secondary effects that are centered more on the U.S. potential 
reaction to a future attack and the impact of this reaction to trade. Any progress on building a 
working relationship in the counterterrorism role needs to recognize and deal with these different 
perspectives of the problem.   
 
There was also a strong emphasis on the linked futures of the three countries.  We should build 
on our shared values of democracy, prosperity, and security to increase the trust that allows for 
efficient cross border trade and flow of people.  These activities are essential to all of our 
economies and, to a large extent, our individual cultures.  In additional, the flow of goods to and 
from the rest of the global economy is critical. 
 
Several looming issues and some opportunities were identified.  Everyone recognized that any 
plan for continental security would be easier to achieve if it was focused on broader security 
issues like transnational crime, with terrorism being a part of the focus.   The flow of illegal drugs 
and the organized crime elements that transport people illegally across the border create an 
atmosphere of corruption that makes progress and security difficult.  In some cases, it was felt 
that Mexico could provide a model for advanced techniques such as biometric identification.  A 
final question fundamental to this approach is to consider the actual benefits, if any, to a tri-
national approach as opposed to a set of multiple bi-laterals. 
 
In conclusion, the fest accomplished its objectives and those involved seemed convinced that 
these types of informal, participatory interactions between cultures are highly useful.  A series of 
fledgling relationships were begun between individuals and organizations and there are 
commitments to follow up with future meetings.  One of the key agreements from the fest was for 
a set of participants representing the three countries to publish a joint paper outlining the 
elements of a Continental Security plan.  The Advanced Concepts Group was encouraged by the 
results of the fest and by the general consensus of the participants that adopting a continental 
approach could result in better security for our three nations. 
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 List of Participants  
Earl Basse Director Operations, O.B.N. Security, Toronto 
Oscar Rocha Director of The Joaquin Amaro Foundation for Strategic Studies 
Ernesto Ruiz Owner, Transportes J y R, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, México 
Dick Gerdes Executive Director, The North American Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico 
Gary Boutelle 
Law Enforcement Coordination Officer (LECO), United States Northern 
Command Interagency Coordination 
Paul Maxwell 
Vice President for Research and Sponsored Projects, University of Texas at El 
Paso 
Michael Theilmann 
Chief, Operational Readiness, Counter-Terrorism Division, Emergency 
Management and National Security Branch, Department of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada 
Gustavo Vega Professor at the Center for International Studies of El Colegio de Mexico 
LTC Dave Whiddon 
Theater Security Cooperation Branch of the Policy and Strategy directorate, 
US Northern Command 
Jessica Glicken Turnley President,  Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc, Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Barry Cardwell 
Deputy Division Chief, Strategy Division, Policy and Planning Directorate, 
United States Northern Command. 
Jon Amastae 
Director of Center for Interamerican and Border Studies, University of Texas at 
El Paso 
Dan Rondeau Deputy to the Director of Applied Physics, Sandia National Laboratories  
David Crane Author, newspaper columnist, Toronto, Canada 
Peter Bates  
Deputy Director, Terrorism, Foreign Affairs Canada 
International Crime and Terrorism Division 
Luis Herrera Lasso Director General, Grupo Coppan, Coyoacan, Mexico 
Victor Trevino Consul Assistant, Mexican Consul Office in El Paso 
Richard Williams District Commander, New Mexico State Police in Las Cruces, New Mexico 
Judy Moore Manager, Sandia National Laboratories Advanced Concepts Group 
Jaime Campos  Executive Director, Border Authority, State of New Mexico 
Dan Drache  
Senior Research Fellow and Associate Director of the Robarts Centre for 
Canadian Studies, York University, Toronto 
Juan Carlos Cue Vega Consul General, Mexican Consul Office in El Paso 
Jorge Chabat  
Professor of the Division of International Studies at the Center for Research 
and Teaching on Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City  
John Whitley Manager, Sandia National Laboratories Advanced Concepts Group 
Bernd "Bear" 
McConnell 
Director, Interagency Coordination, US Northern Command 
Diana Natalicio President, University of Texas at El Paso 
Robert Bach Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue 
Ms. Cathy Bakker 
Analyst and Advisor to the Vice-President of the National Research Council 
(NRC), Canada 
Gerry Yonas 
Principal Scientist and Vice President, Sandia National Laboratories Advanced 
Concepts Group 
Col. Felix Gonzalez Chief, Office of Defense Coordination, American Embassy Mexico,  
Laura McNamara Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center 
Jose Garcia Associate Professor, Government Department, New Mexico State  Univ. 
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Agenda  
Evening of September 14 
6:30 Social 
7:30 Dinner 
? Introductions and sharing of common interests 
? A starting discussion topic at tables to begin the dialogue “What aspects of terrorism 
do you find most terrifying?” 
Day One – September 15 
8:30 Continental breakfast 
9:00 Welcome and Background  
9:30 Opening Panel “The Borderless Threat of Terrorism” 
 Dan Drache (Canada), Bear McConnell (USA), Jorge Chabat (Mexico) 
10:30 Break 
Session 1 - What are the unique issues of terrorism from a tri-national 
North American approach? 
10:45 Written brainstorm 
Consider 4 different perspectives: 
o The terrorist 
o A continental defender  
o Commercial interests  
o Cultural preservation-  
11: 30 Small group refinements  
12:30 Lunch 
1:15 Reports to full group 
Session 2   - What is the role of joint security systems and what are 
the required/desired components/dimensions of such 
systems? 
2:30  Written brainstorm 
Consider 5 different aspects of this question: 
o Detection & interdiction: knowing when a terrorist attack is in the works or 
about to happen and stopping it? 
o Defensive posture:  making it harder for a terrorist attack to succeed 
o Maintaining commerce: effective and secure movement of people and goods 
o Enhancing communication and collaboration within the alliance 
o Policies, strategies and doctrines needed to make joint security systems 
work 
3:15 Break 
3:30 Small group refinements 
4:30 Reports to full group 
5:30 Day one wrap-up and adjourn 
 
-- No formal dinner arrangements on Wednesday -- 
 - 23 -  
 Day Two – September 16 
8:30 Continental Breakfast 
9:00 Welcome and instructions for day two 
Session 3 - What would be an ideal system solution for countering 
terrorism against the North American Continent? 
9:15 Four different groups develop their ideas for an ideal security system to protect North 
America and report back: 
o Mexico team 
o U.S. team 
o Canada team 
o Joint team  
  
11:00 Report backs 
12:00 Lunch 
1:00 Large group discussion of the commonalities and selection of ideas to pursue 
Session 4 - What will be the challenges and opportunities for these 
systems to become operational? 
2:00 Written brainstorm 
? Consider: 
o Social/ cultural challenges 
o Economic challenges 
o Policy challenges 
o Technical gaps  - both short and long term requirements and needs  
o Existing tri- or bi-national efforts 
o Existing research and development and available products 
2:45 3 small group refinements (group identified by color above) 
3:45 Break 
4:00 Reports to full group 
 
Session 5 - Development of a roadmap – recommendations and 
actions 
5:00 Written brainstorm 
5:30   Dinner 
7:00 Development of recommendations, actions, communications, next steps 
8:30 Adjourn 
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